I never said that every time a dispute occurred there would be "all out war." This will not happen until a dispute arises consequential enough that winning it is worth fighting for. Your example of wars between nations is a very good example. Almost every country on the planet is at war with some other country over some dispute or another. And many of these wars are between countries separated by vast oceans, where a serious effort must be employed just to come into contact with each other.

You assume that the incentive for companies would always be to resolve disputes peacefully, but that is not always the case. What if a company's most valuable client is defrauded by the client of another company? Suppose that the other company asserts that no fraud took place. The first company would have a great incentive to fight; otherwise, it would almost certainly lose it's most valuable client and possibly go out of business as a result. The second company would also have a great incentive to fight as they see the efforts of the first company as an active attempt to rob their client. The more sincere and objective the companies' beliefs, the more earnestly they will fight to protect them.

Could you summarize?

Large empires tended to fall apart before the dramatic improvement in communication technologies over the past few centuries.

Still, you're right to some extent. I have not proven that authority will always become more centralized over time. I have merely provided a logical explanation for the empirical evidence that this has been the usual trend throughout human history. In addition, I assert that this logic can be used to both understand and predict the natural tendencies of arbitrary societies.

What I have just described is just the scientific method.

It would not only allow private protection companies. It would encourage them.

However, it is a central authority, because it is the final arbiter of disputes. For example, if a private protection company, or anyone for that matter, were to violate the NAP, it would protect those being harmed. The company could object, saying that it never violated the NAP, but the decision of this authority would be final and it would use physical force to enforce it's judgements.


I wrote an article on the problems with private protection in the absence of a central arbiter in my blog: http://mostlylibertarian.com/principals/necessity-of-central-authority/

Also, a state is not necessarily a "criminal gang."

What I suggest, as a Minarchist, is to have a central authority that's sole purpose is the enforcement of the non-aggression principle, or, in other words, to protect people. It should do this without any initiation of force (including mandatory taxes).

You could try to argue that such an authority would be unfeasible, but it would be ridiculous to compare it to the mafia.

Actually, the company does force it's protection on others. That's the whole point. If someone attempts to rob a client of the company, it will use physical force to prevent them from doing so. No consent from the robber is given for the force being used against him.

Obviously, this is not a violation of the NAP. However, to say that it is not a use of physical force is plain wrong.

What would happen without any central authority?

Many people are aware of the destructive power of central authority and some decide that it is altogether worthless as a result. Yet, it does have one redeeming factor.

First, let’s analyze an anarchist society. Many people would find it difficult to defend themselves through personal physical force anytime they faced a dispute with another. These people would likely hire others to protect them so that they could lead their lives in relative peace. This tendency would likely lead to large companies who’s purpose is the protection of their clients. There would be competition among these companies so they would likely be more efficient than government at achieving this goal.

However, what would occur when a dispute arises between the clients of two of these large companies. Each company would seek to protect their client or risk losing their credibility. In the interest of the client claiming harm done, his company would likely attempt to force the other party into compensation. The company of the other party would attempt to protect him from this use of force. A "battle" would likely ensue until one side is victorious, as refraining from such a fight would constitute failure for the side claiming harm. Such a battle would cause to great violence and destruction.

This scenario clarifies the benefit of a centralized authority as an arbiter. The mess could be avoided altogether by the employment of a powerful centralized authority to resolve all disputes involving physical force. Obviously, this would lead to other problems that must be taken into consideration, such as the difficulty of limiting the power of such an entity. Still, it’s role as an arbiter is a very worthy one.

What is the cause of this distinction in the case of protection, or authority, from the usual efficiency found in free market? Why can't people settle disputes without any centralized arbiter? It is inherent in the use of force that free market principles cannot be applicable. In true free market, every transaction is made with the consent of both parties, meaning that both parties expect to benefit from it. On the other hand, a transaction that results from the use of coercion is made at the expense of one party for the benefit of another. This distinction becomes clear if the previous senario is considered on a larger scale in a longer period of time. After each “battle” one side is victorious, while the other suffers. This is inherent in any transaction resulting from force. After many such battles, the sides that are most often victorious will continually become more powerful; the others will become more irrelevant. Ultimately, one company will be by far the most powerful and all others relatively irrelevant.

This process has been illustrated repeatedly throughout history up until the current state of society. In fact, it existed even before man in the pack structure of wolves and other animals. It has thus been both logically and empirically proven that the natural path of authority is towards central rule. This is a direct result of the nature of coercive transactions, that there must be one winner and one loser.

With this knowledge, it is easy to understand why free market principles of competition and efficiency cannot be applied to coercion. There is a reason that governments have had a monopoly on physical force throughout history. It is not necessarily a bad thing for power to be centralized, so long as that power is used for protection against, not for the initiation of, physical force. However, such a centralized power has rarely, if ever, existed in the history of man.

Obviously, it would be nice if physical force was never used between men. Yet, this is not the case in reality and will never be the case. Unfortunately, the best way to deal with this evil is through a limited centralized authority.


If you enjoyed this post, or just want to argue, check out my blog: MostlyLibertarian.com

Do anarchists enforce their preference of having no government?

Suppose that I lived in an anarchist society and, one day, started a protection company. Suppose further that my company was so good at protecting people that my company grew, to the point where a large majority of the people in the society were hiring my company for personal protection and the competition became nearly irrelevant. Assuming that my company never initiated the use of force, i.e. I never break the Non-Aggression Principle, what would anarchists do?

If you see no problem with this situation then you may want to reconsider your position, because this is Minarchism.